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Toward Transparency and Broader Safeguards 
Conclusion: A Closer Look at the Proposed 
Saudi’s Civilian Nuclear Power Program 
Thaqal Alhuzaymi, Ayodeji B. Alajo 
 
Abstract—The higher the transparency of any civilian nuclear power program, the higher the chance of attracting and securing the long-
term foreign nuclear cooperation.  For newcomer states, securing nuclear cooperation is essential for successful deployment and 
implementation of nuclear power program.  Complying with an acceptable types of safeguards commitment/protocols plays a major role in 
increasing transparency.  The determination of transparency primarily relies on the presence of sensitive nuclear isotopes–as defined 
under IAEA’s safeguards–with a nuclear facility.  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is considering the deployment of civilian nuclear power 
program with a projected nuclear capacity ~18 gigawatt-electric (GWe) by 2032-40.  The goals of this paper were the quantification of the 
sensitive nuclear isotopes (primarily plutonium) that will be produced within the prospective KSA nuclear facilities up to 2040 and the 
estimation of the uranium fuel requirements.  Two scenarios were analyzed.  Scenario-I: two reactors are operational started by 2022 and 
one reactors are added each year subsequently until the intended 11 reactors are deployed.  Scenario-II is like Scenario-I, but only one 
reactor is added each two years subsequent to the deployment of the first 2 reactors in 2022.  Simulation of EPR operation was performed 
from beginning of life to equilibrium cycle using Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP6) code.  A 2-year cycle length was assumed. 
The proposed KSA civilian nuclear power program would require 5766 and 4585 tonnes of cumulative uranium by 2040 for Scenario-I and 
Scenario-II respectively.  The discharged fuel (assuming full power at 90% capacity factor) would contain 17.6 and 13 tonnes of cumulative 
239Pu along with 21.4 and 15.9 tonnes of cumulative total plutonium by 2040 for Scenario-I and Scenario-II respectively.  A primary concern 
related to transparency is the ability and readiness of KSA to handle these quantities of special nuclear material under internationally 
acceptable safeguards protocols as the planed nuclear power program expands.  It’s recommended that KSA have AP in place well before 
2040 to enable IAEA draw the broader safeguards conclusion which definitely will raise the confidence of the international community. 
Index Terms— Additional Protocol, Broader Safeguards Conclusion, Civilian Nuclear Energy Development, MCNP Simulation, Newcomer 
States, Nuclear Transparency, Safeguards Commitiments. 
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION                                                                     
he latest reports by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) indicate an increase in demand for nuclear 
power – a result of increasing electricity demand and 
population growth [1].  Nuclear energy is considered by many 
countries to be one of the safest energy sources that can pro-
duce a reasonable amount of electricity for a long period of 
time.  Rapid population growth, increased electricity demand 
and limited energy resources are driving many developing 
states (newcomers), including the Gulf States, to consider the 
deployment of civilian nuclear power programs [2].  In 2010, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) officially announced such 
a deployment plan and established the King Abdullah City for 
Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE) [3].  KACARE is 
the KSA’s representative to the IAEA.  The establishment is 
also responsible for forming and deploying the KSA civilian 
nuclear power program [3]. 
Since the Atoms for Peace speech in 1953, many lessons 
have been learned in determining the essential factors for the 
successful deployment of civilian nuclear power programs.  
These factors include the ratification of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the maintenance of a status of 
compliance with the IAEA safeguard protocols [4].  The NPT 
is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation re-
gime.  It is important for newcomers to gain the confidence of 
the international nuclear community and attract long-term 
foreign nuclear cooperation.  Thus, newcomer states must 
have an acceptable safeguard protocols in place before the 
deployment of their civilian nuclear power programs.  
The IAEA safeguards system involves a set of obligations 
and commitments: 1) the Comprehensive Safeguards Agree-
ment (CSA), 2) the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) and 3) the 
Additional Protocol (AP).  After the discovery of the Iraqi 
clandestine nuclear weapon program [5], the CSA was proven 
to have limitations that prevented the IAEA from performing 
its duties effectively and sufficiently [6].  Consequently, the 
AP was adopted in 1997 to equip the IAEA with the needed 
tools to verify, deter, and provide assurances of the absence of 
undeclared nuclear activities [6], [7], [8].  The AP aims to 
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the 
safeguards system [6], [7], [8].  Moreover, the AP enables the 
IAEA to draw the broader safeguards conclusion [6], thereby 
raising nuclear transparency at the state level. 
The deployment of a civilian nuclear power program 
comes with the need for a high level of nuclear transparency.  
Jeemin Ha et al. (2014) defined nuclear transparency as refer-
ring to various forms of openness that enhance international 
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confidence and understanding in nuclear matters regarding a 
country [9].  Another definition of nuclear transparency also 
refers to openness [10] – which plays a major role in increasing 
state-level nuclear transparency.  Such openness requires 
compliance with acceptable safeguard commitments that al-
lows the IAEA to provide assurances of the absence of unde-
clared nuclear activities in state. 
2 SCOPE OF WORK 
In this study, fuel cycle factors affecting transparency 
were analyzed by quantifying the sensitive nuclear isotopes – 
as defined under the IAEA’s safeguards – that will be pro-
duced within the prospective KSA nuclear facilities.  Simula-
tions assuming the deployment of light-water reactors were 
performed using Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP6) code.  The 
goal of the simulations was to estimate the uranium fuel re-
quirements and more importantly the amounts of sensitive 
nuclear isotopes (primarily plutonium) produced in the de-
ployment of the planned nuclear power program up through 
2040.  The results will help to reconcile the KSA’s current out-
look toward higher nuclear transparency and the broader 
safeguards conclusion.  Additionally, the study discussed the 
needed number of reactors in accordance to the KSA’s energy 
demand.  Such discussion would allow for an accurate identi-
fication of the needed number of reactors for the KSA’s civil-
ian nuclear power program. 
3 DESCRIPTION OF WORK 
3.1 THE KSA PROPOSED CIVILIAN NUCLEAR 
POWER PROGRAM 
KACARE has been involved in international agreements 
to evaluate, roadmap, and strategize the deployment of the 
KSA’s civilian nuclear power program [3].  Initially, KACARE 
has projected the deployment of 16 power reactors to provide 
at least 17-18 gigawatts-electric (GWe) by 2032-2040 (see Table 
1) [3].  KACARE has not officially announced the deployment 
of a specific type of power reactor, but both of the Evolution-
ary Power Reactor (EPR) designed by AREVA (a French com-
pany) and the AP1000 designed by Westinghouse (a US com-
pany) has been proposed (see Table 1) [3].  Of all the reactor 
types that the KSA has studied, the EPR is the most likely can-
didate.  The Westinghouse AP1000 is unlikely to be deployed 
in near future because KSA has not yet signed the 123 Agree-
ment with United States of America [3].  In contrast, KSA 
signed a nuclear agreement with France in 2011 and an 
agreement with AREVA in 2015 to undertake a feasibility 
study for building EPR [3].  Therefore, this study will assume 
the deployment of EPR. 
The first two power reactors are planned to begin opera-
tion by approximately 2022, followed by the subsequent addi-
tion of one or two reactors until the intended number of reac-
tors are completed [3].  The KSA’s proposed nuclear fuel cycle 
involves three options: 1) importing the nuclear fuel, which 
does not require obtaining a local fuel fabrication and enrich-
ment plants; 2) manufacturing nuclear fuel, which does re-
quire building local fuel fabrication and enrichment plants; or 
3) a combination of the two options (see Table 1).  The KSA 
currently has no nuclear fuel cycle capabilities [3].  If the plans 
of KACARE are followed precisely, the initial nuclear fuel will 
have to be imported when the first two power reactors come 
online in 2022.  For nuclear non-proliferation activities, KSA 
were committed to NPT in 1988, SQP in 2005, CSA in 2009, 
and no AP has been concluded yet (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1 
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED KSA CIVILAIN NUCLEAR POWER 
PROGRAM 

















Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Options or Scenarios 
1-Importation of the fuel 
2-Manufacturing the fuel 














Source: World Nuclear Association. 2016. Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia [3]. 
a, The KSA’s number of reactors will be further discussed in section 4.1. 
b, Non-Proliferation activities are limited, list does not include all conventions. 
c, KSA has not yet signed the AP. 
3.2 THE MAIN SPECIFICATION FOR EPR REACTOR 
The EPR is a 3rd-generation pressurized water reactor de-
signed by AREVA.  Since 2003, EPRs have been considered by 
China, Finland, and France for the production of electricity 
[11].  The EPR offers ~1600 megawatts-electric (MWe) as elec-
trical power, ~ 36% efficiency, and a 60-year plant lifetime 
[11].  The main characteristics of the EPR core are described in 
Table 2 [11], [12]. The EPR is designed to support advanced 
fuel management [11], [12].  The AREVA fuel strategy covers 
cycle lengths of 12, 18, and 24 months [12].  From a power 
production perspective, a longer cycle means a better reactor 
availability factor.  Consequently, the 24-month cycle length 
was considered in this study. 
 
TABLE 2 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EPR CORE 
EPR Core Design 
Number of Fuel Assemblies 241 
Number of Fuel Rods per Fuel Assembly 265 
Fuel Assembly Array 17x17 
Number of Fuel Rods 89 
Number of Guide Tubes per Assembly 24 
Total Fuel Height (cm) 840 
Active Fuel Height (cm) 420 
Fuel Assembly Pitch (cm) 21.5 
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Fuel Rod Pitch (cm) 1.26 
Fuel Pin Diameter (cm) 0.95 
Enrichment (%) Up ro 5%-235U 
Batch Discharge Burnup (MWD/Kg) 55 to 65 
 
3.3 SPECIFICATION OF THE MCNP SIMULATION 
MODEL 
3.3.1 FUEL BURNUP 
The 24-month cycle length (~720 days) was the adopted re-
fueling scheme to allow for longer reactor availability.  There-
fore, The EPR loading pattern of the 24-month equilibrium 
cycle is presented in Fig. 1.  The equilibrium fuel cycle begins 
with the third batch refueling cycles.  The first batch of the fuel 
cycle consisted of 241 fresh fuel assemblies at the beginning of 
life (BOL).  In the beginning of the second cycle, 112 fuel as-
semblies were discharged and replaced with 112 fresh fuel 
assemblies.  In the beginning of the third cycle (the equilibri-
um cycle), 112 of the remaining fuel assemblies from the BOL 
were discharged and replaced with 112 fresh fuel assemblies.  
At this point, the core consisted of 112 fresh fuel assemblies, 
112 one-cycle old fuel assemblies and 17 two-cycle old fuel 
assemblies (see Fig. 1).  After fuel discharge, the decay of 241Pu 
was accounted for.  Due to its relatively short half-life (14.4 y), 
changes in the 241Pu content of the discharged fuel are signifi-
cant over the period of interest.  The half-life is also small in 
comparison with other significant plutonium isotopes.  The 
considered capacity factor is 90% along with 4500 megawatts-



















3.3.2 THE USED MATERIALS 
The used materials in the MCNP simulation model for EPR 
core are described in Table 3 along with their dimensions.  The 
reactor pressure vessel material is 16MND5.  The core barrel 
material is assumed to be 304 stainless steel (304SS), which is 
the standard material that have been used in pressurized wa-
ter reactor (PWR) [11], [13], [14].  For cladding and guide tube, 
the material is M5TM which have been manufactured by ARE-
VA [11].  The composition of M5TM is not publicly released for 
intellectual property reasons.  According to the U.S. nuclear 
regulatory commission (NRC), M5TM consists of 99% zirconi-
um and 1% niobium [15]. 
 
TABLE 3 DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN MATERIALS OF EPR CORE 
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) 




0.16% C, 0.015% Si, 1.30% Mn, 
0.007% S, 0.010% P, 0.74% Ni, 




Material Name Composition (weight %)b In and Out-Diameter 
(cm) 
304SS 0.05% C, 9.00% Ni, 18.00% Cr 205-210.175 
Cladding and Guide Tube 









a, Source: steeldata.info. 2016. 16MND5 Steel [13]. 
b, Source: steeldata.info. 2016. 304 Stainless Steel [14]. 
c, Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).2011 [15]. 
4 DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
4.1 THE KSA’S ENERGY DEMAND VS. THE NEEDED 
NUMBERS OF EPR UNITS 
The goal of this section is to identify the needed number of 
EPR reactors for KSA’s civilian nuclear power program.  Such 
identification is based on the KSA’s targeted nuclear capacity 
which itself based on the projected growth of KSA’s electricity 
demand.  The KSA’s energy demand (electricity) is currently 
rely on fossil fuels, specifically oil and natural gas plants [3], 
[16], [17].  Due to the population growth and the need for 
more desalination plants (desalinated water), the annual elec-
tricity demand is subjected to substantial increase [3], [16].  
Many forecasts projected the annual increase in KSA’s energy 
demand to range from 6 to 8 % [3].  
As indicated by the World Nuclear Association (WNA), 
KSA’s energy demand targeted a total of 128.5 GWe by 2032 
[3].  The targeted KSA’s energy demand consist of 50 GWe by 
solar and geothermal, 60.5 GWe by hydrocarbon (fossil), and 
~18 GWe by nuclear [3].  The KACARE’s website stated the 
same in regard of KSA’s targeted nuclear capacity (17.6 GWe 
by 2032) [18].  In a previous work, analysis of KSA nuclear 
program involving 16 EPR reactors was performed [19].  This 
was in line with KSA project number of power reactors.  
However, one unit of EPR is capable of producing 1.6 GWe 
[11], and therefore, the needed numbers of EPR units would 
be eleven.  The KSA’s initial nuclear targeted data was 2032, 
however, WNA stated that it has been put pack to 2040 [3].  
Therefore, this study would consider both scenarios. 
3 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 3
2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 2 1 1 3
2 1 2 1 1 1 3
1 1 1 1 2 3
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4.1.1 THE ANALYZED SCENARIOS FOR 
OPERATIONAL EPR 
In compliance to the aforementioned information in re-
gards of the KSA’s civilian power program, two scenarios 
were analyzed.  In scenario-I, two EPR reactors would be op-
erational by 2022 and one EPR reactor would be subsequently 
added each year until the 11 reactors had been deployed (see 
Fig. 2).  In scenario-II, two EPR reactors would be operational 
by 2022 and one EPR reactor would be added each two years 
(see Fig. 2).  In both scenarios, the first equilibrium cycles 
would be reached by 2028.  With the implementation of sce-
nario-I, the deployment of the 11 reactors would be complete 
in 2031 and the last deployed reactor would reach the equilib-
rium cycle by 2037.  With the implementation of scenario-II, 
the deployment of the 11 reactors would be complete in 2040 
and the last deployed reactor would reach its equilibrium cy-





















4.2 NUCLEAR FUEL REQUIREMENTS 
In 2022, the KSA’s civilian nuclear power program will 
require 254 tonnes of uranium (see Fig. 3. A) to feed the first 
two reactors.  Under the assumption of scenario-I, a similar 
amount of uranium would be required each year until the 
completion of the 11 reactors in 2031.  Scenario-I would re-
quire 236 tonnes of uranium for refueling by 2031.  Once all 
the 11 reactors have been deployed, the annual uranium re-
quirement will alternate between 354 tonnes and 295 tonens 
starting from 2032, provided the number of reactors and the 
refueling scheme remain the same.  Scenario-I would require a 
total of 5766 tonnes (cumulative) of uranium by 2040 (see Fig. 
3. B).  Under the implementation of scenario-II, the uranium 
needed to fuel the reactors would peak at 717 tonnes in 2040, 
at which time all the 11 reactors would have been deployed 
(see Fig. 3. A).  Scenario-II would require a total of 4585 tonnes 

































From the nuclear fuel point of view, scenario-II seems to be 
a better option for the KSA because of the lower rate of in-
crease in the cumulative required uranium compared with 
scenario-I (see Fig. 3. B).  For the first ten years (2022-32), sce-
nario-I and II would require 3168 and 2070 tonnes (cumula-
tive) of uranium, respectively.  In scenario-I, uranium would 
be required each year either as fresh fuel or for refueling (see 
Fig. 3. A).  In contrast, scenario-II would not require uranium 
each year (see Fig. 3. A) – the uranium requirement started at 
2022 and the following year no uranium, triggering a biennial 
uranium resource demand.  Thus, scenario-II would allow for 
better flexibility and lead time toward the KSA’s completion of 
a robust strategy for safeguards and material accountability in 
the planned nuclear facilities.  From the perspective of electric-
ity production, scenario-I is the better option because it would 
provide the KSA targeted nuclear capacity (17.6 GWe by 
2031).  To this end, the KSA must evaluate both scenarios with 
respect to its nuclear fuel requirements to determine the better 
fit for the state. 
4.3 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IMPACT ON SAFEGUARDS 
AND NONPROLIFERATION 
Weapons-grade plutonium and reactor-grade plutonium 
are both considered potential proliferation risks [20].  By 2024, 
the cumulative discharged fuel (under the assumption of full 
power at a 90% capacity factor) would contain 894 kg of plu-
tonium for both scenarios (see Fig. 4).  An approximately simi-
lar amount would be added each year under both scenarios if 
the reactors were to be operated under the same conditions, 
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including the same refueling scheme.  Thus, the plutonium 
stock in both scenarios will continue to grow.  By 2040, scenar-
io-I would have yielded 21428 kg of plutonium, and 15986 kg 
would have been produced in scenario-II (see Fig. 4).  There is 
no indication that the KSA will invest in nuclear fuel repro-
cessing.  However, it is conceivable that the nuclear fuels may 
be moved.  Discharged fuels require cooling in the spent fuel 
pools of the reactors for up to 5 years before any possible out-
side shipment, either for reprocessing or for transfer to a nu-
clear repository.  Thus, the KSA must have a robust, compre-
hensive and complete strategy for safeguards and accountabil-















Plutonium is regarded by the IAEA as a direct-use nuclear 
material, of which 8 kg is sufficient to produce one nuclear 
bomb [7].  However, 239Pu is the most suitable plutonium iso-
tope for nuclear weapons [20].  The presence of 238Pu and 240Pu 
in the plutonium vector is detrimental to the use of plutonium 
in nuclear weapons [20].  The weight percentages of 238Pu, 
239Pu, and 240Pu with respect to the total Pu for both scenarios 
are presented in Fig. 5. 
The weight fraction of 239Pu/Pu for both scenarios would 
start at 0.71% and increase over time (see Fig. 5).  By 2040, 81 
percent of the plutonium will be 239Pu for both scenarios.  By 
contrast, the weight fraction of 238Pu/Pu for both scenarios 
would start at 0.0064% and decrease over time (see Fig. 5. A.).  
By 2040, the weight fraction of 238Pu/Pu for both scenarios 
would have dropped to 0.0035%.  The weight fraction of 
240Pu/Pu for both scenarios would start at 0.171% and de-
crease over time (see Fig. 5. B.).  By 2040, the weight fraction of 
240Pu/Pu would have dropped to 0.129% for scenario-I and 
0.131% for scenario-II.  
The expected high quantities of plutonium consisting pre-
dominantly of 239Pu indicate the necessity to develop a robust 
safeguards strategy towards; 1) high level of nuclear transpar-
ency, 2) broader safeguards conclusion.  In addition, a robust 
safeguards strategy will allow for; 1) raising the confident of 
the international community, 2) attracting/securing nuclear 
foreign cooperation, and 3) successful deployment of civilian 
nuclear power program.  The KSA have concluded reasonable 
types of safeguards commitment/protocol such as the SQP in 
2005 and the CSA in 2009 [3].  However, with these types of 
safeguards commitment/protocol, the IAEA will not be able 
to conclude that there is no indication of undeclared nuclear 
activities in state [21].  With such types of safeguards com-
mitment/protocol, the state’s safeguards conclusion as well as 
the state level of nuclear transparency will be limited to the 





























  The IAEA’s assessment to nuclear transparency in regards 
of safeguards and nonproliferation, includes many factors 
where the important one is the state compliance to the AP [10].  
Therefore, in the case of KSA, further type of safeguards pro-
tocol that allow for broader access and information will be 
needed.  Given the KSA’s ambitious plan of nuclear power 
program and the projected quantities of direct-use materials, 
the KSA will need to foster its nuclear transparency.  The fos-
tering of such transparency can be achieved by agreeing to AP 
compliance with the IAEA, which will enable the broader 
safeguards conclusion and therefore raise the confident of the 
international community. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
The goals of the described work were; 1) the estimation of 
the required enriched uranium for fueling the proposed KSA 
reactors – assuming the deployment of EPR, and 2) the quanti-
fication of the amounts of sensitive nuclear isotopes, primarily 
plutonium, that will be stored in the proposed KSA reactors 
after refueling.  The reactor operations were simulated using 
MCNP6. A two-year cycle length was assumed for the refuel-
ing strategy.  For the deployment of the KSA reactors, two 
scenarios were analyzed.  In scenario-I, two reactors would be 
deployed by 2022 and one reactors would be subsequently 
added each year until the 11 reactors had been completed.  In 
scenario-II, two reactors would be operational by 2022 and one 
reactor would be added each two years towards the comple-












































































































239Pu/Pu Scenario-I 239Pu/Pu Scenario-II
240Pu/Pu Scenario-I 240Pu/Pu Scenario-II
 
(b) 
Fig. 5. Plutonium Fractions for Both Scenarios; (a) 239Pu/Pu vs. 
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The results indicated a total of 5766 tonnes of cumulative 
uranium for scenario-I by 2040 and 4585 tonnes for scenario-II.  
Scenario-II was suggested as a better option because of its 
lower uranium requirements.  The result indicated a total of 
21.4 tonnes of plutonium (cumulative) for scenario-I by 2040, 
81% of which would be 239Pu; for scenario-II, the correspond-
ing total would be 15.9 tonnes, consisting of 81% 239Pu.  For 
both scenarios, adoption of the AP was therefore recommend-
ed as a first step in fostering transparency and enabling the 
IAEA to conclude the broader safeguards conclusion.  This 
measure will raise the confidence of the international commu-
nity and attract/secure foreign nuclear cooperation. 
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